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I. INTRODUCTION In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
1 the Supreme Court concluded that independent political expenditures do not cause quid pro quo corruption.
2 Because preventing such corruption is the only permissible justification for restricting money in politics, 3 the  Gilbert is the Sullivan & Cromwell Professor of Law at the University of Virginia. Barnes is a graduate of the University of Virginia School of Law and a clerk to Judge Leslie Southwick on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. For helpful comments we thank Debbie Hellman, David Keating, Michael Morley, Dan Ortiz, Brad Smith, Doug Spencer, and participants at a symposium at Florida State University titled "The Law of Democracy at a Crossroads: Reflecting on Fifty Years of Voting Rights and the Judicial Regulation of the Political Thicket."
1. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 2. Id. at 357 (" [W] e now conclude that independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.").
3. See id. at 359 ("When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing corruption . . . , that interest was limited to quid pro quo by a politician's friend. The super PAC then uses the money to air television ads supporting the politician. Neither the company owner nor the friend consulted the politician, and so the politician did not direct the expenditure, and that makes the expenditure independent. But because the friend knows the politician and his electoral strategy, the expenditure benefits the politician as much as a coordinated ad-and can corrupt like one (think favorable oil regulations). This means politicians and their benefactors can coordinate as a matter of fact without coordinating as a matter of law. As one observer put it, "noncoordination is a joke." 10 Prominent voices have called for reform, advocating new and stricter approaches to regulating coordination.
11 Their proposals assume that the concept of coordination makes sense; it just needs broader reach. In other words, they accept that "whole, total, true" independence of expenditures and candidates would stymie corruption, just as the Supreme Court has said, 12 but they argue that existing coordination rules fail to achieve that level of independence.
We believe this reasoning is faulty. Quid pro quo corruption has three necessary elements: (1) a conveyance of value from an individual to a politician, (2) a conveyance of value from a politician to an individual, and (3) a bargain linking the two. By putting distance between individuals and politicians, coordination rules can make it harder for the former to determine what would be very valuable to the latter (perhaps a television ad during primetime) and what would be only a little bit valuable (perhaps a radio spot about the environment). This distance decreases the effectiveness of individuals' expenditures (they may run the radio spot), which reduces the http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/13/obama-super-pacs_n_4958485.html ("Right now our campaign finance system is more loophole than law, and nowhere is that more apparent than what constitutes 'coordination' . . . ."); see also Richard Briffault, Coordination Reconsidered, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 88, 93-94 (2013) (observing that coordination rules "reflect naïve thinking about the way a candidate . . . and a supportive organization can coordinate" given the modern ease of communicating ideas through the press and social media); Richard Posner, Unlimited Campaign Spending -A Good Thing?, BECKER-POSNER BLOG (Apr. 8, 2012), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2012/04/ unlimited-campaign-spendinga-good-thing-posner.html (pointing out that allies of a candidate can figure out what will be most helpful to the candidate "without even talking to the candidate or to party officials").
10. Kyle Langvardt, The Sorry Case for Citizens United: Remarks at the 2012 Charleston Law Review and Riley Institute of Law and Society Symposium, 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 569, 574 (2012); see also Potter & Morgan, supra note 5, at 40 ("FEC regulations that govern whether a group is considered to 'coordinate' its expenditures with a candidate or political party are so permissive that they have proven more apt as a source of comedic inspiration than anything else."); The Editorial Bd., Editorial, The Line at the 'Super PAC' Trough, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2014) , http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/opinion/sunday/ the-line-at-the-super-pac-trough.html (calling single-candidate super PACs "a form of legalized bribery" and calling the prohibition on their contact with candidates "a joke").
11. See infra Section II.C. 12. See Potter & Morgan, supra note 5, at 40.
value conveyed. In theory, this should deter corruption by stifling the first element of quid pro quo corruption-the value conveyed to the politician. In practice, however, deterrence is limited because one can offset a drop in effectiveness with more money. Spending $1 million on a somewhat effective ad can convey a lot of value, more than a smaller amount spent on a very effective ad. Alternatively, coordination rules, by putting distance between individuals and politicians, can make it harder for them to communicate and negotiate. In theory, this should deter corruption by stifling the third element of quid pro quo corruption-the bargain. But again, this fails in practice. Coordination rules do not target bargaining effectively, and it is not clear that they could. These observations lead us to a tentative conclusion: coordination rules simply cannot deter much corruption, at least not when wealthy and sophisticated actors-the very actors who cause the most concern-are involved. As a result, coordination rules may violate the Constitution. This is not because coordinated expenditures do not corrupt but because the coordination rules do not deter. They interfere with political speech without combating much corruption.
This problem cannot be resolved with a broader set of regulations, or even with a broader definition of corruption. Instead, it requires confronting a fallacy of the Supreme Court's making at the heart of campaign finance: the belief that coordination relates in an operational way to corruption.
II. BACKGROUND: THE COORDINATION CONTROVERSY
Corruption comes in many forms, 13 but only one, according to today's Supreme Court, has constitutional significance: the quid pro quo.
14 The quid pro quo-in a typical case, money for votes-has a long history in American politics. George Washington bought votes with liquor, 15 and Spiro Agnew accepted hundreds of thousands of dollars in bribes. 16 Federal bribery law prohibits quid pro quo corruption, 19 but many consider that insufficient on its own because the crime is difficult to prove. As the Supreme Court wrote in Buckley, bribery laws "deal with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence governmental action." 20 Congress has responded to this problem with campaign finance regulations, which serve as "prophylactic controls," meaning they do not punish corruption ex post but aim to prevent it ex ante. 21 They do so by limiting the flow of corruptive money to politicians. Of course, they also limit the flow of uncorruptive money, meaning they prevent some lawful political speech. 22 The Court in Citizens United gestured to the tradeoff when it stated that contribution limits "are preventative, because few if any contributions to candidates will involve quid pro quo arrangements."
23
Recognizing that Congress designs campaign finance regulations to act as prophylactics sharpens the analysis. Before explaining why, we examine some other legal details.
A. Basics of Campaign Finance
The law distinguishes contributions and expenditures. In brief, a contribution refers to money given to a campaign, 24 while an expenditure refers to other money spent to influence an election. 25 The law divides expenditures into two types, independent and coordinated. 19. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (Supp. I 2012) (The statute applies to whoever "directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or promises anything of value" to a public official with intent to influence an official act, or to a public official who "directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value" in return for being influenced regarding an official act. The next Section examines this distinction, but for now an example will suffice. If an individual runs a newspaper ad without any input from the politician it supports, then that individual makes an independent expenditure. If an individual runs the ad at the request of the politician, or if the politician dictates the ad's content, then the individual makes a coordinated expenditure.
Congress has long imposed limits on both contributions and expenditures, 26 and litigants have long challenged those limits on constitutional grounds. 27 The government has defended the limits by arguing that it has an interest in combating corruption. 28 In general, the Supreme Court has sided with the government on contributions 29 and coordinated expenditures 30 and the challengers on independent expenditures.
31
What explains the Court's decisions? The answer lies in its understanding of corruption. 32 The Court has recognized that states have an interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption, 33 where "corruption" means quid pro quos. 34 Contributions, which involve the direct conveyance of money to campaigns, raise a This overview uncovers a tension. Many actors spending money on elections prefer to make independent expenditures, as they are unlimited. But they also like to coordinate, as that increases the value of their spending to the politicians they support (they run the primetime television ad and not the radio spot). This tension has led to expenditures that toe the line between independent and coordinated and focused attention on where that line falls.
B. Coordination Defined
What counts as coordination? 42 The question has "long stymied Congress and the FEC" 43 and just about everyone else. 44 Part of the problem is that the question has two parts. The first involves the Constitution. Following Citizens United, Congress can limit only one type of expenditure, a coordinated one. The constitutional question, then, is: what counts as coordinated for purposes of determining the scope of congressional authority? 45 The second part involves existing federal regulations: assuming they are constitutional, what exactly do they mean? We focus on the second part, but eventually we will return to the first.
The Code of Federal Regulations defines a coordinated expenditure as one "made in cooperation, consultation or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate's authorized committee, or a political party committee." 46 The FEC operationalizes this definition with a three-prong test: payment, content, and conduct. 47 The "conduct" prong, which is the source of controversy, 48 involves the relationship between spender and candidate.
The FEC identifies five situations that, individually or together, satisfy the conduct prong. 49 We summarize them. Consistent with the FEC, we refer to the expenditure in question as a communication.
1. The communication is created, produced, or distributed at the request or suggestion of the candidate.
2. The candidate is materially involved in decisions about a communication's content, intended audience, specific media outlet, timing, frequency, size, prominence, or duration.
3. The communication is created after substantial discussions about the communication between the actor funding it and the candidate. The FEC qualifies these situations in two ways. 51 First, "agreement or formal collaboration between the person paying for the communication and the candidate . . . is not required" to satisfy the conduct prong. 52 Second, except for when the candidate requests an expenditure (situation number one above), the conduct prong is not satisfied if the communication relies only on publicly available information. 53 An example may clarify. 54 If an individual runs a newspaper ad without any interaction with or input from the candidate, then that constitutes an independent expenditure. That is true even if the ad includes a photo taken by the candidate's staff, as long as the photo was publicly available. If the candidate requested or dictated the content of the ad, even without a formal agreement, then the ad constitutes a coordinated expenditure.
C. Controversy and Reform
In the newspaper example, the law may resonate with intuitions. The independent ad probably has less corruptive potential than the coordinated one, so it may seem sensible to impose limits only on the latter. But now consider the scenario from the introduction. An oil baron gives money to a super PAC run by a politician's friend who, up until 121 days ago, worked for the politician. The super PAC runs a supportive ad. The politician did not request the ad, nor did she have any input on it, so the ad is not a coordinated expenditure. But because the friend knows the politician and her strategy, the ad benefits the politician like a coordinated expenditure. Now the law clashes with intuitions. The actual ad has the same corruptive potential as a coordinated ad, but the law classifies it as an independent expenditure that, according to the Supreme Court, does not and cannot corrupt.
This scenario is hypothetical, but it captures the flavor of real events. During the 2012 presidential election, Mitt Romney and top advisors to Barack Obama appeared at fundraisers for supportive super PACs. 55 Those super PACs were run by former aids to those 51. The FEC has other qualifications and safe harbors as well, see FEC, supra note 47, at 4-7, but we only mention those most relevant to this paper.
52 56 In 2010, the National Republican Congressional Committee publicly revealed its ad buy strategy, allowing outside groups to fill gaps in the schedule. 57 Recently, politicians used anonymous Twitter accounts to provide polling information to outside groups running ads. 58 In 2012, the independent group supporting Jon Huntsman raised $2.8 million, $1.9 million of which came from Huntsman's father. 59 Similarly, Space PAC, which supported Congressional candidate Gabriel Rothblatt, raised $225,000, all of it from Rothblatt's parent. 60 Rothblatt claimed that he had "taken pains" not to communicate with his parent, stating, "You don't want to, in a casual conversation, cross a [coordination] line that can turn around and bite you." 61 A recent report concluded that hundreds of millions of dollars spent by outside groups in 2012 involved a "high degree of cooperation" between candidates and those groups.
62
These activities and spending do not run afoul of the coordination limits. 63 The candidates (apparently) have not requested expenditures, nor (apparently) have they provided input on them. This leaves many observers incredulous. 64 They argue that candidates and out- To many unhappy observers of the state of contemporary campaign finance doctrine, the latitude of the Super PAC to operate with the support of allies of the candidate, former staff and friends, and to benefit from the candidate's endorsement or fundraising, seems intolerably silly. So they say that the committee having this connection to the candidate cannot be "truly" side groups routinely coordinate-and may corrupt-as a matter of fact, even if they do not coordinate as a matter of law. 65 As Senator Kent Conrad stated, "[T]his whole idea well, oh, they don't coordinate, therefore it's really independent is just nonsense." 66 Many observers have advocated reforms. Professor Richard Briffault argues that expenditures by groups who focus their support on only one candidate or a very small number of candidates and who have tight links to the candidate(s) should be considered coordinated. 67 The American Anti-Corruption Act, drafted by former FEC Chairman Trevor Potter and promoted by Professor Larry Lessig, would broaden coordination rules. 68 Minnesota's Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Board has concluded that candidates cannot solicit funds for supportive super PACs without crossing the coordination line. 69 The list goes on.
70
independent. In Buckley's terms, though, it is, and any complaints should be directed there.
Id.
65. These proposals assume that the theory of coordination makes sense, it just needs broader reach. In other words, they assume that classifying more expenditures as coordinated, and therefore limited by law, would combat quid pro quo corruption. For that logic to hold, coordination and corruption must be meaningfully linked. But are they?
III. COORDINATION AND CORRUPTION
Consider again the three necessary, logical elements of quid pro quo corruption. 71 First, an actor must convey value to a politician (the "quid"). The value could come in many forms, including a campaign contribution, a briefcase full of cash, or a favor. Second, the politician must convey value to the actor (the "quo"). This could include a vote on favorable legislation, a helpful call to a regulator, assistance promoting the actor's product, 72 and so forth. Third, a bargain must link the two (the "pro"). The actor's conveyance must cause the politician's conveyance and vice versa. The money buys the vote, and the vote buys the money. .org/ppfnotes/press-releases-ppf-notes/a-summary-of-h-r-6448-the-empowering-citizens-act-2/ (describing an act that would, among other things, propose "to strengthen and override the ineffectual coordination regulations adopted by the FEC").
71. These elements are necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, for quid pro quo corruption. Federal bribery law requires proof of another element: the exchange of value between an actor and a candidate must be "corrupt," where the meaning of corrupt is not clear. See Bribery laws punish the satisfaction of these elements: if they are met (or attempted), then the actor and politician go to prison. 73 Campaign finance regulations impede the satisfaction of these elements. This follows from their prophylactic character. The regulations do not punish the crime of bribery but aim to prevent it by blocking one or more steps necessary for its consummation.
To illustrate, consider limits on campaign contributions. They do not impede politicians from conveying value to contributors, nor do they make it harder for individuals and politicians to bargain. 74 Contribution limits do not address these activities (the quo and the pro) in any way. Instead, they limit the value contributors can convey to politicians. By prohibiting donations beyond a certain size-no big quid-they frustrate corruption. Now consider limits on coordinated expenditures. They do not impede politicians from casting favorable votes, awarding lucrative contracts, making helpful calls, employing supporters' relatives, or promoting products. Nor could they impede most of these activities, as most are fundamental to politicians' jobs. The limits do deter politicians from providing direct input on expenditures. However, that involvement is not independently valuable to the makers of those expenditures in the corruption context. For bad actors, using politicians' input to increase the effectiveness of their expenditures is just a means to an end. It seems clear, then, that limits on coordinated expenditures do not aim to prevent corruption by limiting the value that politicians can convey.
If the limits do not target the quo, they must target the quid or the pro. The Supreme Court thinks they do both. Recall Buckley, where the Court wrote, "The absence of . . . coordination of an expenditure . . . undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate." 75 This implies that a coordinated expenditure conveys value. Limits on coordinated expenditures then, like limits on contributions, limit quids. The Court also wrote that the absence of coordination "allevi- 74. Professor Brad Smith concludes otherwise, or at least he understands the Supreme Court to conclude otherwise. He states that "corruption is in the bargain" and contributions "are by definition coordinated with the candidate." Smith, supra note 44, at 618. Limits on such contributions, then, are justified as a method for "limiting contact between speakers and the candidate or his agents." Id. at 619. We respectfully disagree. Most contributions, particularly in the Internet age, come with no contact whatsoever between donor and candidate. More importantly, contribution limits do not and cannot impede bargaining because they are easily sidestepped. A corrupt donor can, without violating the limits, contribute $1 every day, each time meeting with the candidate to bargain. Alternatively, a corrupt donor can make a single, lawful contribution today and meet with the politician every day thereafter to bargain. Indeed, a donor and politician can meet any time they wish, and contribution limits do not and cannot prevent that. ates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate." 76 This implies that coordination facilitates bargaining-the pro-and limits on coordination prevent it. We consider these possibilities in turn. Before doing so, we note that discussions of coordination often blur the line between value (quid) and bargain (pro). 77 Part of our objective is to sharpen that line. Doing so clarifies the theory behind coordination and its weaknesses.
A. Coordination and Quids
In general, politicians have better information about their campaigns than outsiders, meaning they can spend money in support of their campaigns more efficiently. This makes contributions especially valuable, as politicians can use them to maximal effect. So, too, with coordinated expenditures, which politicians can direct or influence to suit their needs. This explains why contributions and coordinated expenditures can act as quids-they convey value to politicians-and why campaign finance law limits them. Now consider independent expenditures. Without input from the relevant politician, who has superior information, such expenditures will be less effective. 78 A
Id. (emphasis omitted).
77. For example, Hasen seems to offer a value theory, observing that a "candidate who raises funds for a group by definition is coordinating fundraising strategy with that group; the candidate is taking time to raise funds for the group rather than for his campaign." Hasen, supra note 68, at 20. Presumably, the candidate is raising funds for the group because he expects the group's expenditures to convey value to him. Ferguson also focuses on value and would allow expenditures to be treated as contributions if there are "reliable indications" that the "expenditure will provide sufficient utility or perceived utility to a candidate such that quid pro quo corruption becomes a strong concern." Ferguson, supra note 70, at 510. But Ferguson also notes that his approach would leave the spender free to make any expenditure "as long as it does not collaborate with the candidate," which suggests some focus on bargaining. Id. at 519 n.231. Smith, interpreting Buckley, offers a bargain theory, stating that "corruption is in the bargain." Smith, supra note 44, at 618; see also restriction on coordinated expenditures . . . must be understood not as a restriction on the expenditures, but rather as a restriction on the action of 'coordinating' the speech with the candidate . . . ."). Bauer seems to focus on both value and coordination. See Bauer, supra note 64 (arguing that for an interaction between speaker and candidate to constitute coordination, it "must involve a matter of strategic significance . . . the core organizational strategy for persuading voters."). Briffault seems to focus on value. See Briffault, supra note 9, at 91, 94 (arguing that single-candidate super PACs are essentially "alter egos for the official campaign committees of the candidates whom they exist[] to serve" and thus it is "unnecessary to establish coordination," which we interpret to mean that value is conveyed even absent a bargain). Hasen criticizes Briffault's analysis for "apparently conflat[ing] coordination with common purpose." Hasen, supra note 68, at 19.
78. The Court's analysis assumes that independent expenditures often do not convey much value and may even take away value. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47 ("Unlike contributions, such independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive."); Bauer, supra note 64 ("Hence the difference between the contribution and the independent expenditure: the supporter running an independent ad may say the wrong thing or say it at the wrong time with the wrong images. 79 Instead of conveying a lot of value, the expenditure conveys only a little.
This conventional account works in theory. To work in practice, the law must do a good job of sorting. Put differently, for coordination regulations to suppress the conveyance of value, expenditures designed with "inside" information from campaigns must properly be classified as "coordinated" and therefore limited. Does the law properly sort? Consider again, briefly, the five situations in which an expenditure satisfies the conduct prong of the coordination test. 80 The first arises when the expenditure is "created, produced, or distributed at the request or suggestion of a candidate." 81 The other four arise when a politician or someone else connected to a campaign directly provides information to an outsider who uses that information when crafting an ad.
These situations capture many expenditures designed with inside information, but they do not capture all. The rules permit outsiders to use any inside information that politicians make public. Outsiders can listen to candidates' speeches; check their websites; read their Facebook posts; follow their Tweets; 82 or use statements, strategies, images, or videos that politicians have made publicly available. 83 This means that outsiders can, without coordinating, get much of the information they need to make their expenditures effective. This is independent expenditure is fraught with the risk of failure, or worse, in advancing the candidate's prospects."). We will show that the logic behind that assumption is not strong. what prompts observers to state that "there's always coordinationthe media is the coordination," which makes non-coordination a "farce." 84 To make this observation concrete, suppose that the value conveyed to a politician by political spending depends on the product of two numbers: the amount spent, and the Efficiency Factor, or "EF" for short. EF takes a value between -1 and 1, where higher values indicate greater efficiency. 85 For contributions and coordinated expenditures, which have maximal effect, EF equals 1. Thus, a contribution of $2000 conveys $2000 in value. What about independent expenditures? An outsider with little knowledge of a campaign's needs and strategies may spend $2000 on a clunky, independent ad. That expenditure may have an EF of just 0.1, meaning it conveys only $200 in value, or even a negative EF, meaning it takes value from the candidate. Here the Supreme Court is right: the absence of coordination undermines the value of the expenditure, reducing the risk of corruption. But now suppose the outsider has a lot of knowledge, all acquired from public sources, of the campaign's needs and strategies. The outsider spends $2000 on a helpful ad with an EF of 0.9, and the ad conveys $1800 in value. That independent ad, which the Court tells us by definition cannot corrupt, looks suspiciously like a coordinated ad that can.
Much of the controversy over coordination reduces to a dispute about EF. Critics argue that outsiders can, without violating the regulations, collect enough information to run valuable ads. 86 This means EF is large. We can understand reforms in the same terms. Proposals to broaden coordination rules by putting more distance between politicians and outsiders would make it harder for outsiders to acquire campaign information. 87 This would reduce EF.
84. TOKAJI & STRAUSE, supra note 7, at 65. 85. To simplify, we assume that the maximum value an expenditure can convey to a politician is the face value of the money spent (in other words, EF cannot exceed 1). Likewise, we assume the most harm an expenditure can cause is the negative face value of the money spent (thus the smallest value of EF is -1). These assumptions keep the math simple without affecting the logic.
86. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 9, at 93-94 (One of the several reasons offered by Briffault is that "[c]andidates and committees don't have to talk . . . they can communicate through the press."); Cummings, supra note 57 (describing how a congressional committee publicly revealed its ad buy strategy, allowing independent groups to use the information to the candidates' benefit without violating coordination rules).
87. The American Anti-Corruption Act, for example, would count as coordinated and therefore limit any expenditure that was crafted with input from a family member or former colleague of the politician. See THE AMERICAN ANTI-CORRUPTION ACT, pt. 2, provision 7, at 7-8 (2015), https://represent.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/AACA-FullProvisions.pdf (recommending that the FEC's coordination regulations be revised).
Suppose critics are right, EF is too large. 88 This means the law classifies some expenditures that are effectively coordinated-they use campaign information and thus convey a lot of value to politicians-as independent expenditures that do not and cannot corrupt. Can the law do better? Stricter coordination rules could further separate outsiders and politicians, but practical and constitutional hurdles limit this possibility. Unless the law prohibits candidates from publicizing their platforms and strategies, and outsiders from paying attention, then outsiders will always have enough information to make expenditures that convey at least some value. Stricter rules might drop EF to 0.6 or 0.3, but they almost certainly cannot drop it below zero.
89
This leads to a deep flaw in the coordination-rules-suppress-quids logic. Recall that the value conveyed by an expenditure equals the amount spent multiplied by EF. Reforms may shrink EF, but they cannot shrink the amount spent. Citizens United holds that independent expenditures cannot be capped. 90 As a result, outsiders who want to convey value to politicians can always do so by simply spending more. Suppose a politician, as part of a corrupt exchange, demands $50,000 in value. If EF equals 0.9, the outsider can convey that amount by spending about $56,000 on independent ads. 91 If EF equals 0.5, the outsider must spend $100,000. As long as EF exceeds zero-as long as independent expenditures benefit politicians, even if just a tiny amount-then outsiders can convey the value necessary for a corrupt transaction.
92
EF almost certainly exceeds zero. The Supreme Court recognizes as much. In McCutcheon v. FEC, 93 the Court stated the absence of coordination "undermines the value of the expenditure to the candi-88. We mean the EF of the average or typical expenditure is too large. For sophisticated outsiders, the EF associated with their expenditures might be very high, while for less sophisticated outsiders it might be relatively low.
89. EF might drop below zero for any given expenditure. However, we conceptualize EF as an average. The claim is not that, if EF exceeds zero, all independent expenditures convey value. Rather, the claim is that the average independent expenditure conveys value. 92. This assumes that outsiders have enough money, which the wealthiest and most sophisticated ones will. We return to this issue below. For now, we note an interesting point made by Brent Ferguson. He argues that "an outside group can probably raise more money if a candidate does the fundraising." Ferguson, supra note 70, at 489. It follows that if candidates cannot assist outside groups with fundraising, at least some of those groups will lack the resources to convey value to politicians. 93. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
date. . . . But probably not by 95 percent." 94 EF almost certainly will continue to exceed zero following any tightening of coordination rules. This means the law, now and always, sorts imperfectly. Some effectively coordinated ads will get treated as independent ads. Those ads, like contributions and coordinated expenditures, convey value and can serve as quids. In fact, because they are unlimited, they make better quids. 95 When EF equals just 0.1, an independent expenditure of $100,000-chump change in American politics 96 -conveys $10,000 in value, much more than any lawful contribution. 97 One might respond that this argument goes too far. If coordination rules are somewhat effective and EF is small, then the rules provide some deterrent effect. If EF is 0.2, for example, conveying $1 million in value requires $5 million in expenditures. Many outsiders cannot afford such large amounts, or if they can, the quo they expect in return will not justify the expense. So while it may be true that, in theory, outsiders can convey value regardless of the (positive) value of EF, in practice they cannot or will not. It follows that coordination rules, even if they do not limit all valuable expenditures, limit some. Better to stop some corruption than none. 98 The response is valid, but note two points. As EF grows, the objection dissipates. Even after a tightening of coordination rules, EF might be close to 1. More fundamentally, to make this argument is to concede an irony of coordination: the law focuses on the least harmful targets. Coordination regulations make it harder for relatively poor outsiders to engage in corruption. They make it harder for outsiders whose corrupt acts will not benefit them much. Such acts probably do relatively little harm to society. Coordination regulations do not deter outsiders with lots of money from engaging in very lucrative-and presumably very harmful-corruption.
B. Coordination and Pros
Corruption, at least the kind modern campaign finance law focuses on, requires a bargain. Someone must convey value to a politician in exchange for a favor and vice versa. The bargain could be explicit, as when conspirators agree to terms over dinner, or implicit, as when a "wink or nod" closes the deal. 99 Coordination limits can deter corruption by frustrating bargaining. The Supreme Court believes they do exactly this, or aspire to, and others have described the Court's reasoning in that manner. Professor Brad Smith uses the term "coordination" synonymously with "discussions and dealings between the parties." 100 Professor Larry Lessig explains the Court's understanding of independent expenditures as follows: "There may be a quid. There may be a quo. But because the two are independent, there is no pro." 101 Do existing coordination rules frustrate bargaining? In theory, maybe a little, but in practice, almost certainly not. Recall, this time in reverse order, the situations in which an expenditure satisfies the conduct prong of the coordination test. 102 The fifth and fourth situations arise when someone (not the politician) recently connected to a campaign provides information to an outsider that is material to that outsider's ad or other expenditure. These situations have very little to do with bargaining. 103 They do not prevent an outsider from hiring someone recently connected to a campaign-the kind of person who could negotiate a deal-nor do they prevent outsiders from talking directly to politicians. The third and second situations arise when the politician provides input on the contents or form of an expenditure. presents a challenge: can we monitor politicians' utterances? Can we be sure Rothblatt and his parent, while barbequing in the family's backyard, do not exchange a few words about expenditures? Setting that aside, bad actors could avoid this situation by not discussing expenditures. In the example, the outsider and politician could agree to the corrupt exchange while leaving the nature of the quid openended. Instead of agreeing to convey expenditures worth $100,000, they could agree that the outsider would convey $100,000 in value. The outsider could then opt to convey the value with expenditures. The coordination rules do not address this kind of corrupt bargaining.
Could tighter coordination rules make it harder for outsiders and politicians to bargain? Probably not, as practical and constitutional hurdles stand in the way. Bargaining proceeds through communication, and the First Amendment takes a dim view of limitations on communication. The law can forbid bargaining over expenditures and campaign strategy, but it cannot forbid discussions generally. Outsiders, politicians, and their low-profile agents can talk on the phone, exchange emails or texts, chat on the subway, exchange a few words at a fundraiser, or meet for drinks in a private backyard. These are settings in which corrupt bargaining may take place, and these are modes of communication that the law probably cannot-and for political reasons, almost certainly will not-reach.
IV. COORDINATION AND THE CONSTITUTION
Recall that the constitutionality of campaign finance regulations turns on their potential to fight corruption. 108 Recall also that the regulations serve as prophylactics. 109 They supplement bribery laws, not by punishing corruption but by stifling one or more of its necessary elements. This means that courts, in assessing the constitutionality of such regulations, must consider their marginal effect on corruption. The question is not, how much corruption does the combination of bribery laws and campaign finance regulations prevent? The question is, how much corruption does the combination prevent above and beyond bribery laws alone?
Answering this question requires an omniscience that we sadly lack. But we can, as courts do, make headway with intuitions. Existing coordination rules cannot stifle a lot of quids. As discussed, the rules allow outsiders to gather information about campaign needs and strategies from public sources. This means their expenditures, even without any campaign contact, can be effective (EF is positive). Effectiveness plus the ability to make unlimited independent expenditures means outsiders can convey value to politicians. Candidates appreciate $1 million spent on somewhat useful (independent) ads, perhaps more than they appreciate smaller amounts spent on very useful (coordinated) ads.
Just as existing rules cannot suppress many quids, or many big ones, they cannot prevent much bargaining. As discussed, most of the provisions do not target bargaining, and bad actors can sidestep the provisions that do. They can bargain without discussing the details of an expenditure or without raising the possibility of an expenditure at all.
These intuitions suggest that existing coordination rules do not prevent much corruption, as bad actors can easily evade the limits. As a result, in the balance that determines the constitutionality of coordination rules, the weight on the "permissible" side of the scale may be light. Meanwhile, the weight on the "impermissible" side remains the same as always. Some non-corrupt outside groups, hoping to exercise their First Amendment rights, would like to coordinate with politicians, and coordination limits stymie them. How to weigh these pros and cons? We do not believe the Constitution provides a clear answer. Our point is simply that the constitutional argument for existing coordination limits may be weaker than commonly supposed. The problem is not that the limits chill a lot of speech (though they might), and the problem is not that coordinated expenditures do not corrupt (they might corrupt a lot). The problem is that the coordination rules hardly deter.
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One might respond that this reasoning, whatever its implications for existing coordination limits, can be disarmed with stricter rules. Broader regulations that reclassify many independent expenditures as coordinated would do a better job of combating corruption, which would in turn strengthen the argument for their constitutionality. Suppose, for example, that the government adopted Professor Briffault's proposal to classify as coordinated, and therefore limited, all expenditures by groups who focus their support on only one candidate or a very small number of candidates and who have tight links to the candidate(s). 111 To spend freely, groups would have to support more candidates and loosen their ties to them-no more former campaign managers on the super PAC staff. This might reduce the effectiveness of the group's expenditures. Rather than relying on the former campaign manager's insights about the politician's needs, the group would have to resort to public sources. Of 110. Recall that our analysis focuses on actual corruption. We briefly address the appearance of corruption below.
111. Briffault, supra note 9, at 97-100. Again, we do not describe the proposal in full, and interested readers should consult Professor Briffault's paper. course, those sources are plentiful and easily accessible, so perhaps their effectiveness would not suffer much. EF may dwindle, but only by a little.
Rather than focusing on ties, one might focus on numbers. Requiring a group to support multiple candidates might make it harder to convey value. Giving $50,000 to a super PAC that supports one candidate benefits that candidate, or is likely to, in a way that giving the money to a super PAC that supports dozens of candidates may not.
112
But this reasoning has a limit, too. If a politician sees an uptick in support from a group following a contribution to that group, he or she may reasonably infer that the support traces to the contributor. 113 Even if not, this problem resolves with the usual antidote: more money. A politician who seeks $50,000 in value from a corrupt actor may not be satisfied by a contribution of $100,000 to a group that supports him and many other candidates. He might, however, be satisfied by a contribution of $500,000.
Dilemmas like these will infect any reform proposal that targets quids. As discussed, unless the government prevents politicians from broadcasting information, and outsiders from listening, those outsiders, or at least the wealthy ones capable of causing the greatest social harm, will have what they need to convey value. Stricter coordination rules cannot do much to suppress bargains either. No plausible, constitutional set of rules will prevent outsiders and politicians from conversing.
This suggests that the constitutional case for stricter coordination rules may not be so strong. Such rules cannot frustrate bargaining, and though they might make it harder to convey value, that effect, given the workarounds, could be small. Meanwhile, stricter rules would chill more speech. Depending on the magnitudes of these effects (and the weights one gives them on the First Amendment balance) the constitutional case for stricter rules might be weaker than that for existing rules.
The preceding arguments may look different if we shift focus from actual corruption to the appearance of corruption. Recall that states have an interest in preventing quid pro quos and the appearance of quid pro quos. 114 Given the widespread dissatisfaction with the existing coordination rules, we doubt that they reduce the appear-112. See id. at 97 ("If an organization is involved in multiple election contests, then donations to the organization cannot be said to go to the aid of a specific candidate. In that case . . . the link between a particular donor and a particular candidate is attenuated.").
113. Suppose, for example, that a group was required to support at least ten candidates. A donor could give the group $100,000, and the group could then spend $1000 supporting each of the first nine candidates, saving the remaining $91,000 for the tenth candidate.
114. See supra Section II.A.
ance of corruption in a meaningful way. If we are wrong, then the constitutional case for such rules is stronger than we have suggested. Similarly, if new, stricter coordination rules would reduce the appearance of corruption, then the constitutional case for those rules would also grow stronger. Before carrying these ideas too far, however, consider the mechanisms through which coordination rules might improve appearances. One possibility is that the appearance of corruption correlates with actual corruption, so that as actual corruption declines appearances improve and vice versa. If that is the mechanism, and given the doubts expressed above about the ability of coordination rules to dampen corruption, we are skeptical that coordination rules, however strict, can improve appearances in a meaningful way.
115 Another possible mechanism is more instinctual: politics just seems less corrupt with coordination rules in place. If that is the mechanism, then things get complicated-and possibly paradoxical. If coordination rules improve the appearance of corruption, and if improving appearances reduces vigilance and enforcement, then coordination rules can improve appearances while making actual corruption worse.
V. CONCLUSION: COORDINATION AS THE WRONG PATH
The foregoing analysis does not square with Supreme Court doctrine. Since Buckley, the Court has made clear that Congress can limit coordinated expenditures. 117 Consequently, there must be a way to define "coordinated" in a constitutional way. Likewise, there must be a way to distinguish "independent" expenditures, which the government cannot limit, from the rest. But the Court has never tried to do this work, perhaps because the challenge is too great.
Consider the Court's declaration in Citizens United: "[I]ndependent expenditures . . . do not give rise to corruption," 118 where corruption means quid pro quos. The term "independent" cannot mean "non-corrupt," or the reasoning becomes tautological. Instead, independent must mean an expenditure that does not convey a quid, involve a pro, or both.
119 Now the logic works, but the operational problem looms. The law cannot sort expenditures into the "independent" category based on whether the spender and politician actually bargained. We almost never know if they bargained, and if we know they did, then the government can prosecute them under bribery laws, rendering proper categorization of the expenditure moot.
120 Likewise, the law cannot sort them on the basis of whether there was an opportunity to bargain. While discussing the contents of an expenditure, an outsider and politician have an opportunity to bargain illegally. But that opportunity is one of many; they can bargain illegally just about any time. Expenditures that come after x+1 bargaining opportunities cannot raise significantly greater corruption concerns than expenditures that come after x bargaining opportunities when x is a half-dozen, twenty, or a hundred.
To see the depth of the problem in another way, consider what it would take for coordination rules targeting corrupt bargaining to serve as a prophylactic, that is, to deter corrupt bargaining that would not be deterred by bribery laws alone. An outsider and a politician would have to be prepared to negotiate a quid pro quo in violation of bribery laws but not prepared to discuss details of an expenditure in violation of coordination limits. 121 119. It could also mean an expenditure that does not involve a quo but, as discussed, that does not work in practice or seem to be the target of the law.
120. Federal bribery law only requires an offer of a favor. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1) (2012). 121. If a violation of coordination rules were easier for the government to detect than bribery, or carried a severer sanction, or both, then an outsider and politician might behave as the sentence states. Perhaps these conditions could be satisfied, but it is hard to see how. The government can prosecute a person for bribery if they simply offer illegal favors. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b). We see no reason to believe that observing a conversation about coordination could be easier than observing a conversation involving an offer of illegal favors. Likewise, the sanction for coordination violations probably will not exceed the sanction for bribery. The sanction for bribery may include imprisonment for up to fifteen years, a fine the greater of three times the value of the bribe or the statutory maximum of $250,000, or both. See 18 U.S. The law also performs poorly when sorting expenditures into the independent category by focusing on value. Here there are two choices: focus on EF, or focus on amount spent. By definition, coordination focuses on EF, which creates the problems discussed. Even broad definitions of coordination will not keep outsiders from gathering what they need, and this plus unlimited spending means they can reliably convey value. This dilemma presumably worsens as technologies change and politicians get better at publicizing, and outsiders at absorbing, key information.
One might respond that we have misdiagnosed the problem. The trouble is not with coordination rules per se but with coordination rules in a world where the only relevant form of corruption is quid pro quo corruption. Perhaps such rules would make more sense if the government had an interest in combating quid pro quos and also "the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors."
122 That was the state of the law before the Roberts Court. But we do not believe this is right. However corruption is defined, it presumably worsens when individuals can convey value to politicians and meet with them or their representatives for quiet conversations. As explained, coordination rules can do little to prevent these activities, at least when wealthy and sophisticated actors are involved. The flaws with coordination do not depend on particular definitions of corruption.
Perhaps all of these observations, troubling though they may be, just support the usual maxim that rules are under and overinclusive. We have shown that coordination rules cannot capture some behaviors they should (corrupt speech) and capture others they should not (non-corrupt speech). Those deficiencies reduce but do not eliminate the value of the rules: surely they stop some corruption.
They probably do stop some corruption, but we have shown that they stop less-perhaps substantially less-than one might think. This does not mean coordination rules should be abandoned. But it does mean that their under-inclusiveness is worse than commonly supposed.
We should not assume that the Supreme Court, when it drew the line between coordinated and independent expenditures, understood the deficiencies with the coordination framework. Nor should we assume that the Court, had it understood the deficiencies, would nevertheless have drawn the line it did. Perhaps the Court, had it considered all of the above, would have concluded that the independhttp://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/01/13/7866/rules-against-coordination-between-superpacs-candidates-tough-enforce.
122. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000) (articulating this broader conception of corruption and tracing it to Buckley).
